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Less May Be More: Reading into FDA's
Labeling Requirements
Diana R. H. Winters*
Last year the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced several
actions designed to improve the quality of information provided to consum-
ers on food labels.' These include an update to the nutrition facts panel-the
table containing quantities of calories and certain designated nutrients that
appears on most packaged food.2 The FDA is also asking for comment re-
garding whether the agency should define the term "natural"3 and redefine
the term "healthy" for use on food labels.4 While the former will make
needed and useful changes to food labels, the quest to further pin down defi-
nitions for words such as "healthy" and "natural" will not result in any im-
provement to our nation's food supply, and the resources needed to take
these actions are better spent elsewhere.5
Defining and enforcing the parameters of permissible and mandated in-
formation disclosure is one of the primary regulatory mechanisms we use to
monitor and improve our food systems. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)6 and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA)7 require ac-
curate and relevant nutritional information on food products so that consum-
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3. "Natural" on Food Labeling, U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 14, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/LabelingNutrition/ucm456090.htm.
4. FDA to Redefine "Healthy" Claim for Food Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Food/NewsEvents/ConstituentUp
dates/ucm520703.htm.
5. This article expands on a blog post the author wrote for the Health Affairs blog.
See Diana Winters, Are the FDA's New Definitions and Labeling Requirements
Good for Us, or Just Empty Calories, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (June 24, 2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/24/are-the-fdas-new-definitions-and-label
ing-requirements-good-for-us-or-just-empty-calories/.
6. This article expands on a blog post the author wrote for the Health Affairs blog.
See Diana Winters, Are the FDA's New Definitions and Labeling Requirements
Good for Us, or Just Empty Calories, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (June 24, 2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/24/are-the-fdas-new-definitions-and-label-
ing-requirements-good-for-us-or-just-empty-calories/.
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
ers may make informed decisions and to promote a more competitive
marketplace. But disclosure requirements can only effect meaningful change
if narrowly crafted to achieve precise objectives; the FDA has so far failed to
articulate these specific goals. In fact, it is unclear whether we, as a society,
can even articulate these goals.
Take, for example, the new federal law passed requiring the labeling of
foods containing genetically modified ingredients.8 The purpose of this law
was to preempt the passage of stricter state laws and to provide consumers
with information they purport to want (polls have found that the majority of
consumers support the mandatory labeling of foods containing genetically
modified organisms (GMOs)).9 The law accomplishes both. But the law falls
short to provide consumers with the information that they actually seek about
the GMO ingredients-whether food products containing them are less safe
than conventional foods.IO
Determining whether one ingredient is safer than another is complex
regardless of whether or not an ingredient is genetically modified. In addition
to the scientific uncertainty of which ingredients are considered "safe," effec-
tively defining the term "safe" to match the wide variance among consumer
expectations can prove even more difficult. Then, once accurately defined, it
may be impossible to clearly communicate an overall metric of "safety" on a
food label. Accordingly, under a false sense of making an informed decision,
consumers who believe that GMOs are less safe than non-GMO ingredients
may be misled by these labels, spending more money for food that is actually
no safer. The GMO labeling law provides consumers with information they
think they want, but not the information they need, and in doing so may alter
consumer preference based on false assumptions.II Worse, the GMO labeling
law utilizes scarce industry and agency resources for implementation and
enforcement. The labeling requirement is just one example of how the failure
to articulate specific goals before mandating disclosure can be harmful.
Because of a shift in resources and priorities under the Trump adminis-
tration, it is uncertain whether the (re)definitions of "healthy" and "natural"
7. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353.
8. Changes to the Nutrition Facts Label, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., Gary Langer, Poll: Skepticism of Genetically Modified Foods, ABC
NEWS (June 19, 2016) (poll shows that 93% of consumers want GMO label-
ing), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=97567&page=1. But see
William Saletan, Unhealthy Fixation, SLATE (July 15, 2015) http://www.slate.
com/articles/health and science/science/2015/07/are.gmos-safe-yesjthecase
.against them is full of fraudliesanderrors.html (arguing that "[t]he war
against genetically modified organisms is full of fearmongering, errors, and
fraud. Labeling them will not make you safer.").




and the continued implementation of the rewritten nutrition facts label will
progress under the Trump administration.12 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to
consider the role and goals of the regulation of disclosure in the context of
food labels for future regulatory efforts. This paper discusses these three
FDA initiatives and explores the role of disclosures as a regulatory tech-
nique. It then proposes several solutions for the disconnect between required
disclosures and targeted objectives.
I. The Regulatory Background
In 1990, Congress passed the NLEA, which required the FDA to stand-
ardize and regulate the "nutrient content claims" and "health claims" of food
labels.13 In the early 1990s, the FDA issued regulations pursuant to this man-
date, explaining that a nutrient content claim is "[a] claim that expressly or
implicitly characterizes the level of a nutrient" in food-like "low fat" or
"high in bran."1 4 And a health claim "characterizes the relationship of any
substance to a disease or health-related condition," 5-e.g., X may "reduce
the risk of heart disease."16 Implied nutrient content claims include claims
that "the food, because of its nutrient content, may be useful in maintaining
healthy dietary practices and is made in association with an explicit claim or
statement about a nutrient."17 Food labels can only contain the word
"healthy" if the food meets certain conditions as to the amount of fat, satu-
rated fat, cholesterol, and other nutrients, as explained in the regulations.18
Although the understanding of how fat affects the body has changed
over the last few decades,19 the FDA has not updated the regulation detailing
the parameter of the term "healthy" since it was issued in the early 1990s.20
This became an issue in 2015 when the FDA notified the Chief Executive
12. See Josh Blackman, Unraveling Obama-Era Regulations on Day One with the
Congressional Review Act, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Nov. 22, 2016), http://
joshblackman.com/blog/2016/11/22/unraveling-obama-era-regulations-on-day-
one-with-the-congressional-review-act/ (identifying revision of the nutrition
facts label as subject to reversal under the Congressional Review Act).
13. See Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) Requirements (8/94 - 2/
95), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 25, 2014), http://
www.fda.gov/ICECInspections/InspectionGuides/ucm074948.htm.
14. Nutrient Content Claims, 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b) (2016).
15. Health Claims, 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(1) (2016).
16. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.75(c)(2), 101.81(c)(2).
17. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b)(2)(ii).
18. 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(d)(2).
19. See, e.g., Jane Brody, What's New in the Dietary Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2016), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/whats-new-in-the-dietary-
guidelines/?r=0.
20. 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(d)(2).
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Officer at Kind, LLC, a company that manufactures protein bars, that the
company was misusing the term "healthy" because the bars contained more
saturated fat than was allowed under the regulations.21 The company re-
sponded that the fat in its bars was derived from nuts, which are "generally
considered to be good for you."22 The media extensively covered the dispute,
which focused on the perceived selective targeting of this company and the
absurdity of the agency's stance on saturated fat.23 The FDA backed down in
mid-2016, letting the company use the term "'healthy and tasty' only in text
clearly presented as its corporate philosophy, where it isn't represented as a
nutrient content claim," and stating that it planned to ask for public comment
soon on the question of how "healthy" should be defined.24 In September
2016, the agency issued a call for public comment on redefining the term.25
The FDA has repeatedly declined to define the term "natural."26 In
1991, as it was working on its NLEA regulations, the FDA solicited public
comment on a definition, stating that "if the term 'natural' is adequately de-
fined, the ambiguity surrounding use of this term that results in misleading
claims could be abated."27 The agency did not, however, define the term,
citing "resource limitations and other agency priorities,"28 and explained that
it would "maintain its policy . . . regarding the use of 'natural,' as meaning
21. KIND, LLC 3/17/15 - Warning Letter, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 17,
2015), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm44
0942.htm.
22. A Letter to our Fans: KIND and Nutrition Policy-Sparking a Healthy Discus-
sion, KIND LLC (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.kindsnacks.com/blog/post/a-letter
-to-our-fans-kind-and-nutrition-policy-sparking-a-healthy-discussion/.
23. See, e.g., Poncie Rutsch, Nut So Fast, Kind Bars: FDA Smacks Snacks on
Health Claims, NPR (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:37 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/sections
/thesalt/201 5/04/15/399851645/nut-so-fast-kind-bars-fda-smacks-snacks-on-
health-claims; see also Anna Almendrala, Why The FDA Action Against KIND
Bars Doesn't Mean They're Unhealthy, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/14/fda-kind-bars-n_7066704.
html.
24. Statement on FDA's Actions on Labeling of KIND Products, U.S. FooD &
DRUG ADMIN. (May 10, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackaging
Labeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm500l84.htm.
25. "Healthy" on Food Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/LabelingNutrition/ucm520695.htm.
26. What is the meaning of 'natural' on the label of food?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm214868.htm.
(last updated Jan. 1, 2017).
27. Terms that Describe Other Aspects of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2407 (Jan. 6,




that nothing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives regardless of
source) has been included in, or has been added to, a food that would not
normally be expected to be in the food."29 In 2013, after a wave of litigation
against food manufacturers regarding their use of "natural" on food labels,
several courts stayed these suits pending the agency's determination.30 In a
letter to these courts the agency again declined to define the term, citing
resource limitations.31 In late 2015, however, the FDA again requested public
comment on the issue, and it received close to 8,000 comments before the
comment period closed in May 2016.32
The nutrition facts panel implements the NLEA's requirement that food
labels contain nutrition information.33 This highly recognizable table on most
packaged foods contains calories, calories from fat, total fat, saturated fat,
trans fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrates, dietary fiber, sugars, pro-
tein, and various vitamins and minerals.34 In 2014, the FDA proposed a rule
updating this label, which was finalized in mid-2016.35 The new label will
update serving sizes to better reflect what Americans are actually eating,
change the required nutrient listings, and require manufacturers to list added
sugars in addition to total sugars. 36
These three FDA initiatives-the definition of "natural," the redefini-
tion of "healthy," and the redesign of the nutrition facts panel-are new
agency actions in various stages of completion.37 As the Trump administra-
tion takes power, changed priorities may mean that the FDA turns its atten-
tion away from these initiatives. I expect this to happen with the definitions
of "healthy" and "natural"-an administration interested in cutting regulation
will most likely be reluctant to expend resources on tweaking such regula-
29. Id.
30. Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine (Indiana
Univ. Robert H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2016-16, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2746200##.
31. Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm'r for Policy, to The Honorable
Yvonne Gonzales Rogers, N.D. Cal., The Honorable Jeffrey S. White, N.D.
Cal., and The Honorable Kevin McNulty, D.N.J. (Jan. 6, 2014), http://
files.dlapiper.com/files/upload/FDA-Letter-to-Judges-Declining-Natural- 1-6-
13.pdf.
32. "Natural" on Food Labeling, supra note 3.
33. Misbranded Food, 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (2010).
34. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c).
35. See Changes to the Nutrition Facts Label, supra note 1; see also Press Release,
FDA Revises Proposed Nutrition Facts Label Rule to Include a Daily Value for
Added Sugars, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jul. 24, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm455837.htm.
36. Changes to the Nutrition Facts Label, supra note 1.
37. Id.
2016] 423
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
tion, especially in an area (defining "natural") that the agency has been am-
bivalent about for decades. As long as the regulations contain a definition of
"healthy," it makes sense for this definition to comport with modem scien-
tific understanding, but the FDA has promised not to pursue violators under
certain conditions in any event. 3 8 The rule updating the nutrition facts panel
has already been issued and is thus more likely to move forward.39 The re-
quirement that food manufacturers disclose added sugars was very controver-
sial and may put this new rule at risk.40 But regardless of whether the new
administration pursues these specific initiatives, this is a good time to step
back and think about the role and usefulness of mandatory disclosure as a
regulatory strategy in regards to food policy.41
II. Information Disclosure as Regulation
Regulating information with mandated disclosure is an extremely popu-
lar regulatory technique. Mandated disclosure is a "standard-one might al-
most say favored-weapon in the arsenals of legislatures, courts,
administrative agencies, and commentators."42 This is so for several reasons.
First, because the provision of more information to consumers tends to gar-
ner broad support.43 Transparency is an easy value to get behind.44 Second,
mandatory disclosure is a relatively inexpensive regulatory technique.45 Re-
formulating labels costs less than reformulating a product to comply with
more stringent regulation.46 Lastly, disclosure laws can displace more strin-
gent regulation, both through explicit preemption (i.e. the federal GMO la-
38. Guidance for Industry: Use of the Term "Healthy" in the Labeling of Human
Food Products, U.S. FoOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/
Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatorylnformation/ucm52
1690.htm (explaining that the agency would exercise enforcement discretion if
a product is "not low in total fat, but ha[s] a fat profile makeup of predomi-
nantly mono and polyunsaturated fats," among other things).
39. FDA Revises Proposed Nutrition Facts Label Rule, supra note 35.
40. Id.
41. The author refers to the agency's requirements for nutrient content and health
claims as mandatory disclosure because even though no food manufacturer is
required to use these terms, they must comply with certain requirements if they
do choose to use them.
42. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PENN. L. REv. 647, 652 (2011).
43. See id. at 681-82.
44. See, e.g., id. at 681-84.
45. Id. at 682.
46. See id. at 682, 739-40.
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beling law preempts stricter state regulation), and by absorbing any political
will for action.47
Mandated disclosure "address[es] a real problem," and "rests on [the]
plausible assumption . . . that when it comes to decisionmaking, more infor-
mation is better than less." But this regulatory technique "regularly fails in
practice."48 In 2011, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider wrote an article
about this phenomenon, identifying various drivers behind the failure of
mandated disclosure; they concluded that this failure may, in fact, be inevita-
ble.49 They point to the complexity of designing effective mandated disclo-
sure as a major obstacle to its success, looking to the compounded
shortcomings of legislators, disclosers, and consumers as factors in the tech-
nique's failure.so Lawmakers must identify a problem, then determine that
mandating disclosure will appropriately address the problem, then determine
exactly what must be disclosed, and then properly articulate a standard.51
Disclosers must determine precisely what to disclose, assemble the necessary
data, and present the information effectively.52 Consumers are often left to
wade through so much information that it becomes impractical to understand,
remember, or properly analyze.53 Ben-Shahar and Schneider conclude that
"[r]arely can each actor accomplish all that is needed, and therefore man-
dated disclosures rarely work as planned."54
Ben-Shahar and Schneider comprehensively analyzed the failure of
mandated disclosure, but such criticism is not new. Scholars have noted the
complexity and precariousness of disclosure as a regulatory technique for
decades. For example, in 1994, Lars Noah discussed the "preferred strategy"
of legislators to use warning labels on consumer products carrying risk, and
explained that decision-makers need to be more selective when choosing a
regulatory strategy to deal with risk and to be more careful in the design of
warnings if warnings are the chosen strategy. 55 He notes the "substantial
costs associated with the overuse of warnings, particularly the twin dangers
of diluting the impact of more serious warnings and prompting counter-
47. See id. at 740; see also National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub.
L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (2016).
48. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 42, at 650-51.
49. Id. at 651.
50. See, e.g., id. at 672-729.
51. Id. at 679.
52. Id. at 692, 695, 696.
53. Id. at 705, 711, 716, 719-20.
54. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 42, at 679.
55. Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the 'Right to Know' from
the 'Need to Know' about Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
293, 295-98 (1994).
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productive consumer behavior in response to overly alarming warnings about
relatively insignificant risks."56
In 1999, William Sage wrote about the use of the disclosure of health-
care information as a regulatory strategy. 57 He discussed the popularity of
mandatory disclosure laws, identified four rationales for disclosure laws in
the healthcare context, and questioned how the implementation of disclosure
laws satisfies these rationales.58 He concluded that although disclosure is a
very appealing regulatory technique, the blanket provision of information
without a theoretical cohesiveness underlying the disclosure scheme is not
always a good thing.59 Information only has value if people can act on it, and
only has meaning if there is a consensus as to the objectives and principles
that underlie the specific context in which the disclosure is taking place.60
III. Effective Food Labeling Disclosures
The FDA has been regulating food-labeling disclosures since its incep-
tion in the late 1930s, and with more focus and authority since the passage of
the NLEA in 1990.61 But before continuing to work within this disclosure
framework and spending resources to incrementally tweak definitions within
the existing framework, regulators should articulate the objectives underlying
the food labeling disclosure scheme and analyze: (1) whether disclosure is
the correct regulatory technique to achieve this objective; (2) what is the
correct standard of disclosure; and (3) the feasibility of effective implementa-
tion, including consumer comprehension.62
As articulated in its 2014-2018 strategic priorities, an FDA objective is
to advance food safety and nutrition.63 The agency works to ensure "truthful
and informative labeling on packaged and other foods," so that "American
consumers can use this information to make healthier choices about the food
56. Id. at 296.
57. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information Disclosure: Disclosure
Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLuM. L. REV. 1701 (1999).
58. See id. at 1710-11. (These four rationales are: the promotion of competition,
the strengthening of agency relationships and the enforcement of fiduciary obli-
gations, improving the performance of the system, and increasing public aware-
ness and political accountability.).
59. See id. at 1826-27.
60. Id. at 1825-27.
61. Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FoOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/
Milestones/ucml28305.htm.
62. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 57, at 1727-28.
63. Strategic Priorities: Strategic Goals and Long-Term Objectives, U.S. FooD &




they eat and help them reduce the risk of chronic disease and facilitate opti-
mal health."64 Mandatory labels are tools to achieve improved health out-
comes by assisting consumers in making good choices.65 Along with other
tools, such as the regulation of production practices and outright prohibitions,
the FDA uses mandatory disclosures to ensure a safe, healthy, and accessible
food supply for the American public.66
Consider the implications of what is known about the effectiveness of
the nutrition facts panel. Studies have shown that consumers actually use the
nutrition facts panel to make decisions about what foods to purchase and eat.
A 2007-2008 FDA survey showed that thirty-four percent of respondents
used the nutrition facts panel "always or most of the time"; by 2009-2010
the number increased to forty-two percent. 67 And evidence suggests that the
use of the nutrition facts panel is associated with better health outcomes. 68
Moreover, food manufacturers have been using the nutrition facts panel for
almost thirty years. 69 While the information on the panels is occasionally
inaccurate, there has been no widespread reporting of mistakes or fraud on
these labels.70 In short, reliance is high, cost of continued compliance is low,
and there is some evidence of effectiveness. It makes sense for the FDA to
update the nutrition facts panel to better reflect the eating patterns and nutri-
ent needs of American consumers.
Defining "healthy" and "natural" is a different story. As long as the
FDA's regulations contain a definition for "healthy," that definition should
reflect current scientific knowledge.71 A better route, however, is for the
agency to abandon this endeavor. But any definition of the words "natural"
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Sage, supra note 57, at 1741, 1747-48.
67. Darlene Superville & Mary Clare Jalonick, New Food Labels Aim to Make
Healthy Shopping Easy, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONINE (Feb. 27, 2014, 10:35
PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/nation-world/nation/article/New-
food-labels-aim-to-make-healthy-shopping-easy-5274885.php.
68. Cf., e.g., Grace Kollannoor-Samuel et al., Nutrition Facts Panel use is Associ-
ated with Higher Diet Quality and Lower Glycated Hemoglobin Concentra-
tions in US Adults with Undiagnosed Prediabetes, 104 AM. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 1639 (Oct. 26, 2016), http://ajcn.nutrition.org/content/104/6/1639.
abstract.
69. Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra note 61.
70. See Tamara Duker Freuman, When Nutrition Labels Lie, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Aug. 21, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/
blogs/eat-run/2012/08/21/when-nutrition-labels-lie.
71. See Use of the Term "Healthy" in the Labeling of Human Food Products:
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and "healthy" will almost certainly be more philosophical than scientific, and
any agreed upon definition will represent a compromise among interested
stakeholders.72 Although one may argue that a food's "healthfulness" should
be an objective determination, any review of the disputes over the nutritional
effects of sugar, or meat, or dairy, demonstrates that the word has many in-
terpretations, and is infused with political and financial considerations. This
is plainly apparent too in the thousands of comments submitted regarding the
agency's potential definition of "natural."73
Still, whether scientific or not, some argue for defining "natural" and
redefining "healthy" to level the playing field for food manufacturers. No
longer will industry have to guess what consumers want by these words, nor
whether they will be held liable for violating state fraudulent practices acts
by misusing these words.74 But this justification is a hollow support. Even
though the FDA has historically used its labeling power to protect industry
from economic fraud, this was always done while also helping the con-
sumer.75 If labels were standard, consumers would not be tempted by
cheaper, but inferior goods represented as equal to or better than superior
products.76 Here both industry and consumers are protected. But negotiated
and compromised definitions of "healthy" and "natural" will help industry, to
the potential detriment of consumers. For example, if a negotiated definition
of "natural" includes products that have been artificially manipulated (like
high fructose corn syrup), consumers will have to be taught that "natural"
does not mean "healthy," nor does it actually mean "natural" in any intuitive
sense of the word.77
IV. Solutions and Conclusion
The FDA has taken several steps toward improving the information that
food manufacturers must provide to American consumers.78 But more infor-
mation is not always better. Unless we can articulate the specific objectives
we are trying to achieve, tailor the regulation of information to these disclo-
sures, effectively monitor the implementation of the regulation, and ensure
that consumers properly understand the information they are given, the ma-
72. See, e.g., Diana Winters, Are The FDA's New Definitions, supra note 5.
73. Docket: Use of the Term "Natural" in the Labeling of Human Food Products,
REGULATIONS.GOV (Jan. 14, 2017, 11:59 PM), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?NoD=FDA-2014-N-1207-0001.
74. See, e.g., Winters, Are The FDA's New Definitions, supra note 5.
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., K. Aleisha Fetters, What Does 'Natural' Really Mean?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Apr. 30, 2015, 10:46 AM), http://health.usnews.com/health-
news/health-wellness/articles/2015/04/30/what-does-natural-really-mean.
77. See id.
78. See Winters, Are The FDA's New Definitions, supra note 5.
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nipulation of information will not improve our food system, and may even do
harm.
For example, what will any FDA definition of "natural" allow for? Will
it only account for ingredients, or will it also take process into account? What
will be the role of genetically engineered ingredients? Will that definition
overlap with the USDA's definition of "organic"? Will food manufacturers
be allowed to call something "natural" if it is "bad" for health (i.e., if it
contains too much of an ingredient shown to be harmful if ingested exces-
sively, like sugar)? Companies may reduce their legal fees, but the consumer
will not be better off. Instead, consumers will either have to understand the
specific parameters of the FDA's definition of natural, or trust the imprima-
tur of government without understanding the compromises inherent in regu-
lation.79 Moreover, the FDA will spend resources that would be better spent
elsewhere in creating and enforcing its regulated definition.80
Instead, the agency should target its precise objectives and write disclo-
sures, information regulations, and an enforcement scheme accordingly. If
the objective is a labeling scheme that clearly communicates to consumers
what they should and should not eat, then perhaps the stoplight system pro-
posed in the United Kingdom would be better.81 Or perhaps it would be bet-
ter if the Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture simply
issued stronger recommendations in the Dietary Guidelines (a document is-
sued every five years often riven with controversy).82 Either of these could be
better solutions than defining "healthy" and "natural" in ways that do not
help consumers.
The regulatory solution may simply be less regulation. By making what
Lisa Heinzerling calls a "noisy retreat"83 from the business of defining what
is "good," the FDA may help the American consumer by forcing the neces-
sity of understanding food without relying on labels. Or the solution may be
more regulation: stoplight labels, outright bans, and stronger recommenda-
tions. Regardless, the solution is not to continue building layers of compro-
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Why Food 'Traffic-Light' Labels Did Not Happen, BBC NEWS (July 11, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/health- 18767425.
82. See Roberto A. Ferdman, We Don't Know What to Eat, WASH. POST: WONK-
BLOG (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/
01 /07/how-the-government-confuses-people-about-food/?utm term=.21621 b72
f86c; see also Brian Secumsky, Breaking it Down: Controversy Over the U.S.
Dietary Guidelines, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (June 23, 2016, 9:46 AM),
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mised definitions from which the consumer is expected to glean meaningful
information, as the agencies have done in the past.
